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Abstract
In late 2008, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis, increased liquidity premia and risk
aversion in the secondary market hindered companies’ ability to issue corporate bonds. In
response, in January 2009, Her Majesty’s Treasury authorized the Bank of England to
establish a facility to purchase commercial bonds through the Asset Purchase Facility. In
March 2009, the Bank of England published details on the Corporate Bond Secondary Market
Scheme, in conjunction with its quantitative easing program. Under the scheme, the Bank
acted as a market maker of last resort in the secondary bond market, making regular
purchases of a wide range of high quality, sterling-denominated corporate bonds. In doing
so, the Bank hoped to improve the functioning of the secondary market, thereby removing
barriers to credit for UK companies. The purchase program was augmented in 2010, when
the Bank began to sell corporate bonds through similar frequent auctions. Purchases through
the scheme peaked in the second quarter of 2010, at £1.6 billion. Citing improved liquidity
in the secondary market and the related decline in usage of the scheme, the Bank began
phasing out the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme in 2013, and it was officially
closed in August 2016.
Keywords: corporate bonds, market maker of last resort, liquidity, Bank of England

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs.
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At a Glance
During the Global Financial Crisis, dealers
in the corporate bond secondary market
withdrew from the market, thereby
constraining access to corporate credit, or
charged increasing liquidity premia,
raising the cost for primary issuers.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To improve market liquidity in order to
remove obstacles to corporate access to credit.
Announcement Date

March 19, 2009

March 25, 2009
To address this liquidity crisis, the Bank of Operational Date
August 4, 2016
England initiated the Corporate Bond Expiration Date
Secondary Market Scheme under its Asset Peak Utilization
£1.6 billion
Purchase Facility (APF) in March 2009.
HM Treasury, Bank of
Through the scheme, the Bank aimed to act Participants
England
as a market maker of last resort, to improve
price discovery and transparency, and to
revitalize the secondary market rather than to replace it. It conducted multiple purchases of
small quantities of corporate bonds each week in the secondary market. Bonds were
required to be issued by corporations that made a material contribution to economic activity
in the UK. In 2010, the scheme was extended so that the Bank could sell, as well as purchase,
corporate bonds.

The scheme was utilized throughout 2009 and 2010, with purchases peaking at £1.6 billion
in the second quarter of 2010. In 2013, the Bank announced that regular sales would stop,
and that the scheme would be utilized only if there was market demand. No such demand
materialized, and in August 2016, the scheme was formally closed.
Summary Evaluation
The Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme is generally viewed as successful, but its
effects are difficult to isolate from those of the larger APF and quantitative easing program
that were initiated by the Bank simultaneously.
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Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme: United Kingdom Context
$3,102.8 billion in 2007
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$2,948.0 billion in 2008

Source: Bloomberg
$50,567 in 2007
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$47,287 in 2008

Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4 2007:

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Sovereign credit rating (5year senior debt)

As of Q4 2008:

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Source: Bloomberg
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$4,895.3 billion in total assets in 2007
Size of banking system

$5,299.6 billion in total assets in 2008

Source: Bloomberg
157.8% in 2007
179.8% in 2008

Size of banking system as a
percentage of GDP

Source: Bloomberg
Data not available for 2007/2008
Size of banking system as a
percentage of financial
system

Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
76.8% of total banking assets in 2007

5-bank concentration of
banking system

79.1% of total banking assets in 2008

Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
14% of total banking assets in 2007
Foreign involvement in
banking system

19% of total banking assets in 2008

Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
Data not available for 2007
Government ownership of
banking system

1% of banks owned by the state in 2008

Source: Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends and
Implications”
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100% insurance on deposits up to $4,000; 90% on
next $66,000 in 2007
Existence of deposit
insurance

100% insurance on deposits up to $93,000 after
October 2008

Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset, OECD
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Overview

Background
During the Global Financial Crisis, the cost of issuing new debt rose as investors demanded
increased liquidity premia. In addition, increased cost of funding inventories of corporate
bonds caused banks to withdraw from the secondary market (Pattani et al. 2011). In early
2009, the Bank of England deemed that poor liquidity in the secondary corporate bond
market could negatively affect the primary market, further constraining the availability of
credit in capital markets. Spreads in the primary market over gilts were already wide, and
widening further as issuance increased (Figure 1) (Fisher 2010).
Figure 1: Investment-Grade Corporate Bond Spreads(a)

Source: Fisher 2010
Program Description
The framework for the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme (the Scheme) was laid out
in the exchange of letters between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the
Bank of England that established the Asset Purchase Facility (APF). It was formally
introduced through a Bank of England Market Notice on March 19, 2009, and became
operational on March 25. Through the Scheme, the Bank proposed “to provide a back-stop
offer to purchase modest amounts of a wide range of investment-grade sterling UK corporate
bonds with the aim of improving secondary market liquidity, initially by facilitating marketmaking by banks and dealers.” It hoped that the purchase would reduce liquidity premia on
high quality corporate bonds, and thus remove obstacles to corporate access to capital
markets (Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” March 19, 2009).
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Similar to the requirements for the Commercial Paper Facility (CPF), in order to be eligible,
bonds had to be investment grade and issued in sterling by companies that made a material
contribution to economic activity in the UK. Reverse auctions were held multiple times a
week, in which counterparties submitted bids for the price they were willing to sell specific
bonds. The Bank did not buy every bond at each auction, since it privately established a
minimum spread at which it would purchase each bond (Benford et al). The Bank would
readily purchase up to £5 million of each bond in a given auction, depending on the amount
of the issuer’s outstanding debt. For issuers with less than £250 million outstanding, the
bank would stand ready to purchase up to £2 million of each bond, and for those with more
than £250 million outstanding, the Bank would stand ready to purchase up to £5 million
(Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” March 19, 2009).
The Bank regularly posted traded prices on its wire service and its website. Following each
reverse auction, around 1 p.m., the Bank published information on the successful yield
spreads and quantities purchased in individual eligible bonds. Additionally, each Friday the
Bank published the total amount of corporate bonds purchased the previous week as well as
the sum of corporate bonds purchased, less redemptions, through the Scheme (Bank of
England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” March 19, 2009).
As part of the larger APF, the purchases were financed by central bank reserves through the
Bank’s quantitative easing program, which was announced by the Monetary Policy
Committee on March 5, 2009. By injecting money into the economy through the purchase of
public and private sector assets, including corporate bonds, the Bank aimed to stimulate
spending to reach the 2% inflation target (Bank of England, “Market Notice: Sterling
Monetary Framework; Asset Purchases,” 2009). On February 4, 2010, however, the
Chancellor authorized the Bank’s purchases under APF to be financed by the issuance of
Treasury bills (Bank of England APF Quarterly Report 2010 Q2).
In January 2010, the Bank decided to extend the APF by offering to sell, as well as purchase,
corporate bonds through the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme. The Scheme
opened to sales on January 8, 2010. The Bank planned to sell each security in which it had a
nominal holding over £1 million every Friday. However, it reserved the right to not sell any
security, and determined how much of each bond to sell (between £1 million and £5 million)
by “tak[ing] into account a number of factors, including the size of the Bank’s existing
holdings of the issuer’s bonds.” Similar to the purchase program, the Bank published
information on the successful yield spreads and quantities sold for each individual bond
following the auction (Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility, Corporate
Bond Secondary Scheme,” December 22, 2009).
Rather than target a specific amount of corporate bond purchases, and later sales, the
Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme was designed to last only until normal conditions
returned to the primary and secondary markets (King 2009). The ultimate goal of the
Scheme was “to be catalytic, helping to reinvigorate the market, rather than replace it”
(“Markets and Operations,” 2009).
Outcomes
Purchases through the Scheme peaked in the second quarter of 2010, at £1.6 billion. This
represented a small percentage of the overall bond market, which before the crisis totaled
about £70 billion (Fisher 2010). In 2013, the Corporate Bond Secondary Scheme was moved

494

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 2 Iss. 3

to operating only if warranted by market demand. Since none was indicated through mid2016, and because at that point the Bank introduced a new Corporate Bond Purchase
Scheme, the Corporate Bond Secondary Scheme was formally closed on August 4, 2016
(Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility, Corporate Bond Purchase
Scheme,” August 4, 2016).

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The Scheme was launched to provide a backstop offer to purchase small amounts
of a wide range of high quality sterling corporate bonds in order to aid secondary
market liquidity.
The purchases were expected to assist market-making by banks and dealers, to reduce
liquidity premia on high quality bonds, and therefore remove obstacles to corporate access
to capital markets. The Scheme was also expected to complement purchases of commercial
paper under the CPF (Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” 2009).
2. The Scheme was announced without a size limit or an end date.
The Scheme was a part of an Asset Purchase Facility (APF) that had a ceiling initially set at
£50 billion. However, for the Scheme, rather than setting a specific timeline or target
purchase amount, the Bank of England designed the facility to last for as long as the highly
abnormal conditions in corporate credit markets that were impairing finance of real
economic activity persisted (Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,”
2009).
3. The Bank consulted with the industry in the design of the Scheme.
Before the operation of the Scheme, a market notice announcing the program requested
feedback from the industry. The request included invitation for detailed comments from all
interested parties—existing and potential new issuers, investors, intermediaries, and
infrastructure providers, including issuing and paying agents and ratings agencies (Bank of
England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” 2009).
4. The Scheme purchased eligible corporate bonds from market-making firms in the
secondary market.
Unlike the CPF, the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme specifically targeted
secondary market liquidity. The goal of the Scheme was to improve impaired market
liquidity that had resulted from dealers’ capital constraints and risk aversion during the
crisis (“Markets and Operations,” 2009). Secondary market illiquidity in turn restricted the
strength of the primary market, impairing access to credit. To improve secondary market
liquidity, the Bank purchased corporate bonds exclusively from market makers (Bank of
England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” March 19, 2009).
These design decisions reflected the Bank’s desire to act as a Market Maker of Last Resort
(MMLR). As an MMLR, the Bank hoped to “aid improvements in the liquidity of the market,
including by reducing the inventory risk to ‘market makers’” (Tucker 2009). Though the
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Bank purchased bonds only in the secondary market, it believed that establishing itself as an
MMLR would reinvigorate both the secondary market and the primary market (Fisher 2010).
5. The Scheme conducted the purchases via frequent reverse auctions, with a
maximum amount of £5 million per bond per auction.
In each auction, the Bank was restricted to buying no more than £5 million of each bond,
depending on the amount of the issuer’s outstanding debt. Though that amount was
relatively small, the frequency of the auctions, which at the beginning of the Scheme occurred
four times a week, was intended to signal to bond holders that they could sell bonds if
necessary. The Bank believed that this would lower the interest rates that counterparties
charged for holding corporate bonds (Benford et al. 2009).
Purchasing small quantities of corporate bonds also aligned with the MMLR framework,
which the Bank specified involved transacting in “modest quantities” (Fisher 2010).
Purchases through the Scheme were much smaller than the gilt purchases undertaken
through the APF. Initially, critics of the Scheme pointed to the small amount of bonds
purchased as a sign of failure. However, the Bank insisted that this reflected a
misunderstanding of the Scheme’s intent, which was to improve the process of price
discovery and encourage private sector demand (Fisher 2010). In addition, Bank officials
noted that though large scale corporate bond purchases may have helped drive down market
spreads, it also may have displaced private sector demand, asserting that “the problem was
in the functioning of the market, not a lack of demand for the assets” (Fisher 2010).
6. Pricing information was made publicly available.
As previously discussed, the Bank made pricing information publicly available after each
reverse auction. This was critical to improving price discovery and transparency and to
establishing pricing points (“Markets and Operations,” 2009). This transparency aimed to
reduce uncertainty over the market value of corporate bonds, in turn reducing the risk
aversion that contributed to market illiquidity (Benford et al. 2009).
7. The Scheme was extended to sales of corporate bonds in 2010.
Despite improvements in the primary market throughout 2009, dealers in the secondary
market were still reluctant to trade in corporate bonds. Illiquidity in the market was
attributed to an absence of buyers as well as to dealers’ fears that they would be unable to
buy back bonds from the APF (“Markets and Operations,” 2009). This led to the Bank’s
decision in early 2010 to open up the Scheme to sales as well as purchases of corporate bonds
(Fisher 2010). Bank documents confirm that the extension of the Scheme to sales was
specifically aimed toward “catalys[ing] secondary market liquidity” (Bank of England,
“Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility, Corporate Bond Secondary Scheme,” December 22,
2009).

III. Evaluation
In 2010, Bank officials pointed to record issuance of sterling corporate bonds (Figure 2),
diminished spreads for eligible bonds (Figure 3), narrowed bid-offer spreads, and a
contracted bond-CDS basis as evidence that the Scheme increased access to financing in the
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primary market (Fisher 2010). This was attributed to the Corporate Bond Secondary Market
Scheme’s impact on illiquidity premia. Counterparties also reported anecdotally to the Bank
that the publication of pricing information and auction results “reduced the uncertainty for
investors in valuing their portfolios and established, for dealers, a price at which others were
willing to sell” (“Markets and Operations,” 2009). Despite these improvements in the
primary corporate bond market, illiquidity remained in the secondary market. This led to
the Bank’s decision to modify the Scheme in order to sell, as well as purchase, bonds (Fisher
2010).
Figure 2: Cumulative Gross Issuance of Sterling Bonds by UK PNFCs

Source: Fisher 2010
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Figure 3: Median ‘APF Eligible’ Corporate Bond Spreads(a)

Source: Fisher 2010

Figure 4: Usage of the CPF and the Scheme

Source: Fawley and Neely 2013
In their comparative study of four quantitative easing programs, Fawley and Neely assert
that by acting as an MMLR, the Bank “quickly restored market functioning and the price floor
established by the purchase programs did not bind for long.” While purchases through the
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CPF peaked quickly, the secondary corporate bond market took longer to recover. Figure 4
depicts the facility’s continued use through 2012 and its peak in purchases, at £1.6 billion, in
the second quarter of 2010 (Fawley and Neely 2013).
It is difficult to isolate the effects of the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme from the
broader impact of quantitative easing. For example, in the primary market, quantitative
easing “is estimated to have been a significant factor in lowering gilt yields, and may in turn
have increased corporate bond issuance” (“Markets and Operations,” 2009). In examining
the success of the Bank in “invigorating corporate credit markets,” officials also
acknowledged that private sector purchases, including those through the Corporate Bond
Secondary Market Scheme, were aided by the larger quantitative easing program, the low
Bank Rate, and large monetary stimulus within the UK and abroad (Fisher 2010).

IV.

References

Bank of England. 2009. “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility (March 19, 2009).”
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bank_of_England_Market_N
otice_Asset_Purchase_Facility_2009_03_19.pdf.
Bank of England. 2009. “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility – Corporate Bond Secondary
Market
Scheme
(December
22,
2009).”
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bank_of_England_Market_N
otice_Asset_Purchase_Facility_Corporate_Bond_Secondary_Market_Scheme_2009_12_22.pdf
.
Bank of England. 2009. “Market Notice: Sterling Monetary Framework; Asset Purchases
(March
5,
2009).”
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/marketnotice090305.pdf.
Bank of England. 2010. “APF Quarterly Report 2010 Q2 (July 26, 2010).”
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2010-q2%20Bank%20of%20England.%202010.%20APF%20Quarterly%20Report%202010%20Q.
pdf.
Benford, James, Stuart Berry, Kalin Nikolov, Mark Robson, and Chris Young. 2009.
“Quantitative Easing.” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2009 Q2: 90-100.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/quantitative-easing.pdf.
Fawley, Brett W., and Christopher J. Neely. 2013. “Four Stories of Quantitative Easing.”
Federal
Reserve
Bank
of
St.
Louis
Review,
95(1):
51-88.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fawley_and_Neely_2013.pdf
.
Fisher, Paul. 2010. “The Corporate Sector and the Bank of England’s Asset Purchases.”
Speech given at the Association of Corporate Treasurers, Winter Paper 2010, February 18,
2010.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fisher_The_Corporate_Secto
r_and_the_Bank_of_England%E2%80%99s_Asset_Purchases_2010_02_18.pdf.

499

Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme

Simon

King,
Mervyn.
Letter
to
Alistair
Darling,
January
29,
2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Letter_from_Chancellor_to_
Governor_Bank_of_England_January_2009_1.pdf.
“Markets and Operations.” 2009. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2009 Q4: 258-271.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/markets-and-operations2009-q4.pdf.
Pattani, Aashish, Giuseppe Vera, and James Wackett. 2011. “Going Public: UK Companies’ Use
of Capital Markets.” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2011 Q4: 319-330.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Going_Public_UK_Companie
s_Use_Of_Capital_Markets_2011.pdf.
Tucker, Paul. 2009. “The Crisis Management Menu.” Speech given at the SUERF, CEPS, and
Belgian
Financial
Forum
Conference,
November
16,
2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/the-crisis-managementmenu-tucker-2009.pdf.

V.

Key Program Documents

Summary of Program
Asset Purchase Facility: Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme (2009-2016). – Bank of
England
overview
of
Corporate
Bond
Secondary
Market
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/[ARCHIVED%20CONTENT]
%20Asset%20Purchase%20Facility%20%20Corporate%20Bond%20Secondary%20Market%20Scheme%20(20092016)%20_%20Bank%20of%20England.pdf.
Bank of England Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility (03/19/2009). – Bank of England
Market Notice detailing structure and implementation of Corporate Bond Secondary Scheme
under
APF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bank_of_England_Market_N
otice_Asset_Purchase_Facility_2009_03_19.pdf.
Bank of England Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility, Corporate Bond Secondary Market
Scheme (12/22/2009). – Market notice detailing extension of Corporate Bond Secondary
Market
Scheme
under
APF
to
sales
of
corporate
bonds.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bank_of_England_Market_N
otice_Asset_Purchase_Facility_Corporate_Bond_Secondary_Market_Scheme_2009_12_22.pdf
.
Bank of England Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility Corporate Bond Secondary Market
Scheme (09/20/2012). – Market notice that consolidates the purchasing side of the Corporate
Bond
Secondary
Market
Scheme
with
the
selling
side.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Bank_of_England_Market_N
otice_Asset_Purchase_Facility_Corporate_Bond_Secondary_Market_Scheme_2012_09_20.pdf
.

500

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 2 Iss. 3

Fisher, Paul. (2010). “The Corporate Sector and the Bank of England’s Asset Purchases.” –
Speech given on the rationale behind the Bank’s purchase of private assets.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fisher_The_Corporate_Secto
r_and_the_Bank_of_England%E2%80%99s_Asset_Purchases_2010_02_18.pdf.
Implementation Documents
Settlement Procedures for Counterparties Participating in the Bank of England’s Asset
Purchase Facility (APF). – Settlement procedures governing the Corporate Secondary Market
Scheme
dated
March
5,
2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Settlement_Procedures_For
_Counterparties_Participating_in_the_Bank_of_England's_Asset_Purchase_Facility_2009_03_
05_0.pdf.
Terms and Conditions for Counterparties in the Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility
(03/05/2009). – Terms and conditions governing the Corporate Secondary Market Scheme,
dated
March
5,
2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Terms_and_Conditions_for_
Counterparties_in_the_Bank_of_England's_Asset_Purchase_Facility_2009_03_05.pdf.
Press Releases/Announcements
Bank of England Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility: Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme
(08/04/2016).
–
Market
notice
for
closing
of
scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Market_Notice_Asset_Purch
ase_Facility_Corporate_Bond_Purchase_Scheme_2016_08_04.pdf.
Key Academic Papers
Fawley, Brett W., and Christopher J. Neely. (2013). “Four Stories of Quantitative Easing.” –
Comparative study of the quantitative easing programs of the Federal Reserve, Bank of
England,
European
Central
Bank,
and
Bank
of
Japan.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fawley_and_Neely_2013.pdf
.
Reports/Assessments
“Going Public: UK Companies’ Use of Capital Markets.” – Article examining bond and equity
issuance during the Global Financial Crisis, including the Bank of England’s intervention
through
the
Corporate
Bond
Secondary
Market
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Going_Public_UK_Companie
s_Use_Of_Capital_Markets_2011.pdf.
“Markets and Operations.” – Article in Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin reviewing
developments in sterling financial markets and Bank’s official operations; see in particular p.
269.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/markets-andoperations-2009-q4.pdf.

501

Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme

Simon

Copyright 2015, 2016, 2020 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this
material or to receive permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the
Yale Program for Financial Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.

502

